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Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating a set of divisible goods toN agents in an online manner
over T periods, with adversarially-chosen normalized valuations in each period. Our goal is to
maximize the Nash social welfare, a widely studied objective which provides a balance between
fairness and efficiency. On the positive side, we provide an online algorithm that achieves a
competitive ratio of O(logN) and O(log T ), but also a stronger competitive ratio of O(log k)
in settings where the value of any agent for her most preferred item is no more than k times
her average value. We complement this by showing this bound is essentially tight: no online
algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of O(log1−N) or O(log1− T ) for any constant  > 0.
1 Introduction
We study an online resource allocation problem where each day some divisible resource becomes
available, and we need to design an algorithm that distributes it among a set of N agents, aiming
to reach a fair and efficient outcome. At the beginning of each day t, every agent i informs the
algorithm about their value vi,t for the resource that just became available, and the algorithm
irrevocably decides how to split this resource, without knowing the agents’ future values. If agent
i is allocated a fraction xi,t of the resource, then her utility increases by xi,tvi,t, and after all the
resources have been allocated, the total utility of each agent i is ui(x) =
∑
t vi,txi,t.
A common measure of efficiency in resource allocation settings is the utilitarian social welfare,
i.e., the sum of the agents’ utilities,
∑
i ui(x). Conveniently, this is easy to optimize even in the
online setting that we study here: allocate the entire resource to the agent i with the highest value
vi,t on each day t. However, it is easy to see that this approach can “starve” many of the agents, by
allocating nothing to them each day, which is unacceptable in many settings of interest.
As an example, consider a setting where the processing time of a shared computing cluster needs
to be divided among the employees of a firm, or university. Each user may have a high value for
gaining access to the cluster on some days (e.g., due to a conference deadline), and be willing to
pass up on her access on other days. Although it makes sense to prioritize the users who need the
resource the most each day, every user deserves some access to this shared resource. For another
example that has received some attention, consider the food banks that allocate food each day to
soup kitchens and other local charities [Prendergast, 2017]; the number of people coming to each
distribution facility varies from day to day, affecting each facility’s demand for food, but, apart from
efficiency, the food bank also wants to ensure some measure of equitability in its allocation.
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Motivated by the need for fairness considerations when allocating these resources, we turn to
the literature on fair division. An extreme measure of fairness from this literature is the egalitarian
social welfare, or maximin welfare (MW), which is equal to the minimum utility over all agents,
mini{ui(x)}. This objective interprets fairness as making sure that the least satisfied agent is as
happy as possible. However, maximizing this objective can lead to highly inefficient outcomes, by
allocating resources to agents that are hard to satisfy instead of agents that can really benefit from
them. Although we briefly address this objective, the focus of this paper is on the Nash social welfare
(NSW), a less extreme objective that is known to provide a natural balance between fairness and
efficiency. The NSW objective is equal to the geometric mean of the agents’ utilities,
∏
i ui(x)
1/N ;
it was initially proposed about 70 years ago [Nash, 1950, Kaneko and Nakamura, 1979], and has
recently been receiving a lot of attention. Apart from a balance between fairness and efficiency, it
is also known to satisfy other desirable properties, including scale-independence, meaning that the
scale of the agents’ valuations does not affect the NSW maximizing solution [Moulin, 2003].
In contrast to maximizing the utilitarian social welfare, which can be achieved in an online
manner, the problem becomes much harder when fairness considerations are introduced. Although
computing an allocation that maximizes the NSW (or the MW) objective is a well-understood and
computationally tractable problem in an offline setting [Nisan et al., 2007, Chapter 5], we prove
that this is impossible to achieve online. To provide some intuition for that, note that achieving
fairness may require that some resources are allocated to agents other than the one with the highest
value for them. But, to decide whether this should happen and when, offline algorithms use the
valuations of the agents for all the resources, whereas online algorithms cannot foresee whether each
agent will be easy to satisfy or not before they see all their values. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first work that studies the extent to which we can optimize the NSW objective when the
items arrive online, and our main results are matching upper and lower bounds for this problem.
1.1 Our Results
Our main result is the Set-Aside Greedy algorithm which, as we show, achieves a competitive ratio
of O(log(min{N,T})) with respect to the NSW objective (see Theorem 2), where N is the number
of agents and T is the total number of days (or resources). The algorithm works by dividing each
resource in two halves and allocating each half using a different approach: the first half is allocated
equally between the agents and the second half is allocated in a greedy manner aiming to myopically
maximize the NSW. However, this combination of the two approaches would fail, were it not for a
crucial adjustment to the agent utilities that are used in the greedy portion of the algorithm. In
particular, on each day t, instead of using the actual utility that each agent has accrued up to that
day, the greedy algorithm uses “promised utilities”. The promised utility of each agent on day t
corresponds to the actual utility that the agent has accrued from the greedy allocation up to that
day, plus a 1/(2N) fraction of her total remaining future value. Although the agent has not yet
accrued this additional utility, she is guaranteed to eventually receive it from the first half of the
resources, due to an imposed normalization of the valuations such that
∑
t vi,t = 1 for every i.
Our second main result shows that the Set-Aside Greedy algorithm is essentially optimal, by
proving that no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of O(log1−N) or O(log1− T ) for
any constant  > 0 (see Theorem 3). This construction is quite involved so, in order to provide
some intuition, we first prove an analogous result for the maximin welfare objective in Section 3.2.
Specifically, we show that no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than O(
√
N)
for the maximin objective (see Theorem 1). Although this objective is quite different than the
Nash social welfare, the technique we use for this result resembles the (much more demanding) one
used for the Nash social welfare, and the proof also provides some intuition regarding the types of
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obstacles that arise when introducing fairness considerations in online resource allocation.
Technical Highlights. The use of promised utilities plays a central role in our algorithm. From an
algorithmic standpoint, it avoids a “cold start” problem that a myopic greedy approach suffers from:
while there still exist agents whose accrued utility is really low (or zero), which is bound to be true
during the first rounds, the standard greedy approach would overcompensate by allocating large
portions of the resources to them, even if they have a really low value for these resources, leading to a
competitive ratio of Ω(N) (see Proposition 2). The Set-Aside Greedy algorithm circumvents this by
guaranteeing a minimum utility of 1/(2N) for each agent, using the first half of each resource, and
then allocating the second half in a greedy manner while accounting for the future value promised to
each agent. From an economic standpoint, this has parallels to the notion of the ‘property rights’ of
an agent in a collective to benefit from a shared resource. Our work in a sense gives an algorithmic
rationale for the need for such rights, by showing their use in optimizing NSW in an online setting.
Apart from their conceptual significance, our use of promised utilities in competitive analysis
may be of independent interest. At a high level, we leverage the Eisenberg-Gale program for
optimal NSW allocations to construct a dual certificate to bound the optimality gap of an arbitrary
allocation. We then use a novel potential function to track changes in this dual certificate. While
our approach is in the spirit of regret analysis in online learning, it introduces several new ideas to
deal with the NSW objective and normalized values, which may prove of use in other settings
Paper Structure. Before presenting our upper and lower bounds for the NSW objective in Sections
4 and 5, respectively, we use Section 3 to provide some intuition regarding the algorithmic challenges
that arise when introducing fairness into online settings. Apart from the lower bound for the
maxmin social welfare, this section also includes examples of algorithms that fail to achieve a good
competitive ratio for the NSW. We conclude with Section 6, where we discuss ways in which our
results can be generalized, and provide additional motivation and context regarding our model.
1.2 Related Work
Our work builds on a long literature on online resource allocation. An interesting relevant example
is the work of Devanur and Jain [2012], which considers the problem of allocating items to agents
in an online fashion, aiming to optimize a generic objective function F (x) =
∑
iM(
∑
t xitvit),
where M is a non-decreasing concave function. In fact maximizing the Nash social welfare can be
expressed in this form if we pick F (x) =
∑
i log(
∑
t xitvit) (and re-scale valuations to avoid negative
values of F (x)) by taking a logarithmic transformation of the geometric mean. However, despite
this interesting connection, the multiplicative approximation guarantees that this work achieves for
this function would not translate to any interesting guarantees with respect to the geometric mean.
Another important difference is that in our setting the agent values over all rounds are normalized,
which provides an interesting indirect restriction on the adversary. We provide a detailed discussion
regarding the motivation for and the necessity of this assumption in Section 6.
The main obstacles that we face in this paper are more closely related to the obstacles that com-
monly appear in the growing literature on online fair division. Specifically, defining and achieving
fairness often requires a more holistic view of the instance at hand, which is exactly what online
algorithms lack. For example, a common barrier in this work is the algorithm’s inability to distin-
guish between agents that will be easy to satisfy later on, and those that will be hard to satisfy. The
same issue arises even for very different notions of fairness than the ones considered in this paper.
For example, Benade et al. [2018] consider a setting similar to ours, but the items being allocated
in their case are indivisible, i.e., can be allocated only to a single agent (so they use randomness),
and that their goal is to minimize the amount of envy among the agents. Due to essentially the
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same obstacles that we face, they show that the best way to minimize the expected maximum envy
(up to sub-logarithmic factors) is to totally disregard the agent valuations and allocate each item
uniformly at random among the agents, leading to a bound of O˜(
√
T/N).
In more recent work, Zeng and Psomas [2020] revisit this setting and study the extent to which
approximate envy-freeness can be combined with approximate Pareto efficiency. They consider a
spectrum of increasingly powerful adversary models and they show that even for a non-adaptive
adversary (which is weaker than the adaptive adversary model we consider in this work) there is
no algorithm that can guarantee the aforementioned approximate envy while Pareto dominating
the random allocation algorithm. They define an outcome to be α Pareto-efficient if improving
every agent’s utility by a factor α is infeasible, and they show that it is impossible to combine the
envy bound with a 1/N approximation of Pareto efficiency, which is a trivial approximation that
the random allocation algorithm satisfies. Note that our competitive ratio guarantees in this paper
directly translate into approximate Pareto efficiency bounds. Specifically a competitive ratio of α
for the the Nash social welfare directly implies an α approximation of Pareto efficiency.
Bogomolnaia et al. [2019] also consider the sequential allocation of divisible resources, and they
also impose a very similar normalization on the agent valuations as the one we do in this work. The
main differences are that they enforce envy-freeness as a constraint, and instead aim to maximize
social welfare, and, more importantly, that they assume the valuation vectors of the agents are drawn
from a distribution. Using this assumption, they weaken the fairness envy-freeness constraint to
be satisfied only in expectation. He et al. [2019] also study a setting similar to ours, but allow
the reallocation of some of the previously allocated items, and show that envy-freeness up to one
item can be achieved using O(T ) re-allocations. Other works considered the question of online fair
division in a setting where values of agents are random, e.g. Kurokawa et al. [2016] study the notion
of maxmin share in such a setting. Another line of work on dynamic fair division, which is not
very closely related to our work, considers settings where it is the agents, instead of the items, that
arrive (and possibly depart) online, e.g., Friedman et al. [2017, 2015], Li et al. [2018].
Finally, a lot of recent work has focused on approximating the Nash social welfare objective in
offline settings. It has played a central role in the literature on the fair allocation of indivisible
items, which has focused on the computational complexity of optimizing this objective. This prob-
lem is APX-hard [Lee, 2017], but recent work has led to a sequence of non-trivial approximation
algorithms (e.g., Cole and Gkatzelis [2015], Cole et al. [2017], Anari et al. [2017, 2018], Garg et al.
[2018], Barman et al. [2018], Garg et al. [2020]). Also, a very influential paper by Caragiannis et al.
[2019] showed that maximizing the NSW objective when allocating indivisible items leads to approx-
imate envy-freeness, which provided additional motivation for studying this objective. Beyond the
literature on indivisible items, approximations of this objective have also been studied in strategic
settings, where the values of the agents are private information. In this case, research has focused
on the design of truthful mechanisms that approximate the NSW [Cole et al., 2013] or the analysis
of non-truthful mechanisms with respect to their price of anarchy with respect to the NSW [Brânzei
et al., 2017]. In contrast to this work, in this paper we assume that the agent valuations are public
and focus on the complications introduced by the online nature of the problem.
2 Setting
A set of N agents compete for items over T rounds, with a single divisible item arriving in each
round. Each agent i has per-unit value vi,t ≥ 0 for the item in round t. We denote xi,t ≥ 0 as
the fraction of the item allocated to the agent i on round t, with
∑
i xi,t = 1. Under allocation
x = {xi,t}i∈[N ], t∈[T ], the total utility of agent i is given by ui(x) =
∑T
t=1 vi,txi,t. While the valuations
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vi,t can be otherwise arbitrary, we assume they obey the following property:
Assumption 1 (Normalized valuations). For every agent i ∈ [N ], their values satisfy∑Tt=1 vi,t = 1.
For maximizing Nash social welfare, normalized values can be assumed without loss of generality
in static settings; in an online problem, however, it becomes a meaningful assumption about the
information available to the principal. We discuss the necessity of this assumption for non-trivial
results and its practical justifications in Section 6.
In our setting, at each round t, an online algorithm is a mapping from history of previous rounds
and the agents’ values on the current round {vi,t}i∈N to an allocation xt = {xi,t}i∈N to be made on
this round. Since we consider divisible item setting and utilities of agents are linear in allocations,
we can without loss of generality focus on deterministic algorithms.
We evaluate the quality of the final allocation x of an online algorithm using two widely studied
objectives: the maxmin welfare and the Nash social welfare. Under allocation x, the maxmin welfare
(MW) corresponds to the minimum utility across all agents under x, while the Nash social welfare
(NSW) is defined as the geometric mean of the agents’ utilities. Formally, we have:
MW(x) = min
i
{ui(x)} , NSW(x) =
(∏
i
ui(x)
)1/N
The performance of our algorithms is measured in terms of their competitive ratio with respect
to each of these objectives. Let xˆ(v) denote the allocation that the algorithm outputs on an instance
v := {vi,t}i∈[N ], t∈[T ], and let xMW(v) and xNSW(v) denote the optimal allocation for instance v
with respect to the maxmin and Nash social welfare objectives respectively. Then the competitive
ratio of this algorithm with respect to the two objectives is defined as
γMW = max
v
MW(xMW(v))
MW(xˆ(v))
, γNSW = max
v
NSW(xNSW(v))
NSW(xˆ(v))
.
3 Warm-Up: Challenges in Introducing Fairness to Online Settings
Before presenting our Set-Aside Greedy algorithm and the matching upper and lower bounds for
its competitive ratio, we briefly provide some insights regarding the difficulties that arise when
introducing fairness considerations in online settings. We first demonstrate how simple fail to
achieve better than a polynomial competitive ratio for NSW, and then we show that no algorithm
can get better than a O(
√
N) competitive ratio for maxmin welfare.
3.1 How Simple Algorithms Fail in Online NSW Maximization
The simplest algorithm for allocating items in a balanced fashion is uniform allocation, which sets
xi,t = 1/N for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. This results in final utilities ui(x) = 1/N for all i, and suffers
from a worst-case competitive ratio of N (for example, when vi,t = 1{i=t} ∀ i, t, then the optimal
algorithm gives each agent a final utility of 1). An alternative to uniform allocation is proportional
allocation, which sets xi,t = vi,t/
∑
j vj,t for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], resulting in utility profile
ui(x) =
∑
t∈[T ](v
2
i,t/
∑
j vj,t). Under normalized valuations, this enjoys the following guarantee:
Proposition 1 (Proved in Appendix A.2). The utility profile under proportional allocation (weakly)
Pareto dominates the utilities under uniform allocation.
Nevertheless, proportional allocation fails to get better than O(
√
N), as we show below:
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Figure 1: Lower bound construction for maxmin welfare from Theorem 1 with N = 9 and T = 10. Values
of 0 are indicated with ‘·’, and the special agent in each group of 3 is highlighted in bold red.
Example 1 (Proportional allocation fails to achieve high NSW). Consider an instance with T = N
rounds such that for each round t agent i = t has a value of vi,t = 1/
√
N , and every other agent
has a value of vi,t = (1− 1/
√
N)/(N − 1). Since ∑i vi,t = 1 for all t, therefore under proportional
allocation agent i gets ui(x) =
∑
t v
2
i,t =
1
N
(
1 +
√
N−1√
N+1
)
≤ 2N ; this is also the Nash social welfare
since all the agents receive the same utility. On the other hand, setting xi,t = 1{i=t} results in
ui(x) = 1/
√
N (and hence also the NSW), which gives a competitive ratio of
√
N/2.
Finally, a natural online approach is a greedy algorithm, which for each round t, chooses allo-
cations {xi,t}i∈[N ] to maximize the Nash social welfare at the end of that round. Surprisingly, this
turns out to perform as poorly as uniform allocation.
Proposition 2 (Proved in Appendix A.3). Myopic greedy has Ω(N) competitive ratio.
The intuition behind this is that by giving higher priority to agents whose current utility is low,
myopic greedy can end up allocating items to agents with very small values in the current round,
while ignoring agents with substantially larger values.
3.2 The Inapproximability of the Maxmin Welfare Objective
To build some intuition into the challenges of online fair allocation from the hardness side, we next
show that for a closely related problem of MW maximization, no algorithm can have competitive
ratio of O(
√
N). This proof is instructive, in that its main idea forms the basis of our lower
bound construction for NSW in Section 5: when facing identical agents in earlier rounds, an online
algorithm can do no better than treat them symmetrically; however, some of these agents may
later have high value in rounds with low competition, while others may only care for items that are
highly competed for, making them harder to satisfy. An algorithm with access to future valuations
can prioritize the latter agents in earlier rounds, which no online algorithm can hope to achieve.
Adapting this for NSW, however, is much more complicated.
Theorem 1. For maxmin welfare, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than√
N
2 +
1
2
√
N
, even if all the vi.t values are constrained to be in
{
0, 12
}
.
Proof. We construct a family of instances where N is a perfect square, and T = N+1. The instance
with N = 9 is depicted in Fig. 1. Agents are grouped into
√
N groups, each of size
√
N , with one
special agent chosen uniformly at random in each group. The T rounds are grouped in
√
N epochs
of
√
N rounds each, plus one final round. In each epoch i, only agents in the corresponding group
i have non-zero values. In the first round of epoch i, the
√
N agents in corresponding group i have
value 12 ; in the subsequent
√
N − 1 rounds, each agent in the group except for the special agent
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resolves, i.e., has value 12 while all other agents have value 0. In the very last round (that is, the
T th round), the
√
N special agents all arrive simultaneously with value 12 .
By symmetry, an online algorithm can do no better than allocating uniformly among the agents
with nonzero value in each round: This gives a utility of 1
2
√
N
+ 12 for every non-special agent, and
1√
N
for every special agent. On the other hand, consider an algorithm that allocates the entire
item to the special agent in the first round of each epoch, and allocates uniformly among the agents
with nonzero value in each other round: This algorithm gets utility at least 12 for all agents, which
immediately gives a
√
N
2 lower bound for the competitive ratio of any online algorithm. In more
detail, one can compute that the optimal offline algorithm allocates 1 + 1N − 1√N of the first item
in each epoch to the special agent, resulting in a final utility of 12 +
1
2N for all agents. Hence, the
competitive ratio of any algorithm is bounded below by
γMW ≥
1
2 +
1
2N
1√
N
=
√
N
2
+
1
2
√
N
.
4 The Set-Aside Greedy Algorithm for Online NSW Maximization
In this section, we present our main positive result: the Set-Aside Greedy algorithm, which achieves
a O(log(min{T,N}) competitive ratio for Nash social welfare.
We begin by giving an informal description of the algorithm. Set-Aside Greedy divides every
item in half, and uses a different strategy for allocating each half:
• The set-aside half is distributed uniformly among the agents, such that each agent receives at
least a 1/(2N) fraction of every item. Since values are normalized, this ensures that at completion,
every agent receives a utility of at least 1/(2N).
• The greedy half is allocated so as to maximize the NSW, while incorporating the knowledge that
each agent is guaranteed to receive a utility of 1/(2N) from the set-aside half.
Note that the allocation rule for the greedy half is here is different from the myopic greedy algorithm
discussed in Section 3; in myopic greedy, the allocation in round t is made so as to maximize the
NSW at the end of the round, while in Set-Aside Greedy, the greedy rule incorporates the fact that
each agent will receive at least a 1/(2N) fraction of their future value. This circumvents the issues
suffered by myopic greedy discussed in Section 3.1.
To define the algorithm formally, we first introduce some additional notation. For each i ∈ [N ]
and t ∈ [T ], let yi,t and zi,t to be the semi-allocations to person i in round t from the first and second
halves of the item, respectively. In other words, xi,t = yi,t + zi,t, and
∑
i yi,t =
∑
i zi,t = 1/2∀ t.
Definition 1 (Promised utility). Given round t ∈ [T ], current allocation zt = {zi,t}i∈[N ], and
historical semi-allocations zt′ = {zi,t′}i∈[N ] ∀ t′ < t, the promised utility u˜i,t of agent i is defined as:
u˜i,t(z1, z2, . . . , zt−1, zt) =
1
2N
+ zi,tvi,t +
t−1∑
t′=1
zit′vit′ .
The name comes from the fact that as long as half the item is distributed uniformly (that is,
yi,t =
1
2N ), under any allocation rule {zi,t} for the other half, the promised utility gives a lower bound
for the final utility an agent receives (i.e., ui(x) ≥ u˜i,t(zt) ∀ t). Moreover, after the final allocation is
made, the two quantities coincide (i.e., ui(x) = ui,T (zT )), thus delivering on the promise. Though
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promised utilities depend on all the previous semi-allocations, for notational simplicity we henceforth
use the shorthand u˜i,t(zt), dropping the dependence on previous allocations.
Algorithm 1 presents the full details of the Set-Aside Greedy algorithm. We henceforth use xˆ, zˆ, yˆ
exclusively to denote the allocations and semi-allocations produced by this particular algorithm.
Half the item is allocated uniformly yˆi,t = 1/2N , and the other semi-allocation zˆt is chosen to
maximize Nash social welfare of promised utilities u˜i,t(zt). Note that the semi-allocation zˆt is
written in terms of the equivalent Eisenberg-Gale convex program
∑
i log(u˜i,t(zt)). While this can
be solved in polynomial time via any standard convex optimization solver, in Appendix A.4 we
present a simpler and more efficient way of performing this step, which leads to an overall running
time of O(TN).
ALGORITHM 1: Set-Aside Greedy algorithm
1: for all t = 1 to T do
2: Set-aside semi-allocation: for each agent i set yˆi,t = 1/(2N)
3: Greedy semi-allocation: compute zˆt = arg maxzt {
∑
i log(u˜i,t(zt))} subject to
∑
i zi,t ≤ 12 , zi,t ≥ 0
4: Allocate xˆi,t = yˆi,t + zˆi,t
5: end for
Note that Set-Aside Greedy does not need to know what the value of T is.
We also note that one can modify the algorithm so that the half of each item that we set aside
is actually allocated in a proportional manner instead of uniform by setting yˆi,t =
vi,t
2
∑
j vj,t
. In
Proposition Proposition 1 we showed that this approach would also guarantee that every agent
i will get the utility of at least 12N and weakly Pareto dominates the uniform allocation on all
instances. This would arguably lead to a more practical algorithm (as well as remove the need to
know N in advance), without affecting any of our theoretical results. However, since we do not
take advantage of such improved performance in our analysis, we assume that the set-aside half is
allocated uniformly, for simplicity.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. For a given instance v, let k(v) , T maxi,t{vi,t}. Then the Set-Aside Greedy algorithm
achieves competitive ratio
γNSW ≤ 2 ln(min{k(v), N}) + 2 ln(2) + 1.
In particular, for any instance v, Set-Aside Greedy achieves γNSW = O(log(min{T,N}).
We henceforth denote the maximum value k(v) by just k when the dependence on v is clear.
Note that k(v) is the ratio between the maximum value and the average value across all agents (due
to normalization, the average value for any agent is 1T ). Since vi,t ≤ 1, we always have k(v) ≤ T .
Parameterizing the bound in terms of k captures the intuition that when values are not much
larger than average (across rounds), the performance of the online algorithm should improve. At
the extreme, when values are equal across all rounds, the problem becomes trivial as the optimal
solution is uniform distribution.
The rest of the section is devoted to proving the result above. We start by describing a duality-
based approach for constructing an upper bound on the competitive ratio of a given allocation. We
then leverage this technique to prove the theorem above.
4.1 A Duality-Based Upper Bound for the Competitive Ratio
In proving the main result of this section, we employ a dual optimization problem that allows us to
construct a certificate of approximation during of execution of the online algorithm. We also show
8
that the Set-Aside Greedy algorithm can be interpreted as greedily minimizing promised prices,
which can be viewed as lower bounds on the dual solution.
Informally, the following lemma states that for any allocation, one can construct a vector of
“prices”, one for each round, such that the average price bounds the competitive ratio of the alloca-
tion.
Lemma 1. We are given values v, NSW maximizing allocation x∗, and allocation x˜. Then for any
‘price’ vector {pt}t∈[T ] ∈ RT+ such that pt ≥ vi,tui(x˜) for every agent i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], we have
NSW(x∗)
NSW(x˜)
≤
∑T
t=1 pt
N
Proof. Consider the value profile v and the allocation x˜, and let p be a vector of prices that satisfy
the constraints in the statement of the lemma. We can now write p as a solution to a linear program
(P ), with corresponding dual program (D):
(P ) min
p∈RT+
T∑
t=1
pt
s.t. pt ≥ vi,t
ui(x˜)
∀ i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]
(D) max
x∈RNT+
N∑
i=1
ui(x)
ui(x˜)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
xi,t ≤ 1 ∀ t ∈ [T ]
Here we define ui(x) =
∑T
t=1 xi,tvi,t. We stress that only x (but not x˜) is a variable in the dual
program. By LP duality, any feasible solution p for the primal program (P ) gives an upper bound
for the value of the dual program (D). Substituting x = x∗, the optimal NSW solution, we get
1
N
N∑
i=1
ui(x
∗)
ui(x˜)
≤
∑
t pt
N
.
Finally, via the AM-GM inequality, we have 1N
∑N
i=1
ui(x)
ui(x˜)
≥
[∏N
i=1
ui(x
∗)
ui(x˜)
]1/N
= NSW(x
∗)
NSW(x˜) .
Given this lemma, it is useful to re-interpret the Set-Aside Greedy algorithm in terms of dual
prices.
Suppose, in light of the lemma above, one wants to achieve good competitive ratio by choosing
allocation x that minimizes prices pt. The problem is, the right side of the inequality pt ≥ vi,tui(x) ,
namely total utility ui(x), depends on future values and allocations, which are unavailable to an
online algorithm.
A natural fix to this problem is to construct a lower bound for ui(x), and a corresponding upper
bound for the feasible price pt. This is exactly what the earlier defined promised utility u˜i,t(zi,t)
does, because, as noted earlier, promised utility lower-bounds the final utility (if we commit to
allocating half of the item uniformly yi,t = 12n).
Let’s call the corresponding upper bound for the price p˜t(zt) = maxi
vi,t
u˜i,t(zi,t)
promised price.
Since it does not depend on future rounds, one can alternatively choose semi-allocations zt in order
to minimize the promised price p˜t(zt) on this round. In fact, doing so leads to exactly the same
allocation as Set-Aside Greedy, as we show with the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For the allocation zˆt chosen by Set-Aside Greedy in round t, for any agent i with
allocation zˆi,t > 0, we have
vi,t
u˜i,t(zˆi,t)
= maxi′
vi′,t
u˜i′,t(zˆi,t)
= p˜t(zˆi,t).
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Proof of Lemma 2. Fix the round t of the algorithm’s execution, the values vi,t and promised utilities
at the beginning of the round u˜i,t(0) of the agents. We prove the lemma by reducing step t of online
allocation to a static Fisher market and showing that the statement of the lemma is equivalent to
the KKT conditions for this market.
Consider the following Fisher market: there are N agents and M = N + 1 items. Item i is only
valued by agent i at vFisheri,i = u˜i,t(0) (i.e. their promised utility excluding current round allocation),
agents i′ 6= i have zero value for item i, that is, vFisheri′,i = 0. Agents value the last item at vFisheri,M =
vi,t/2. Then utility of agent i from a static allocation x is xi,iu˜i,t(0) +
xi,T vi,t
2 .
Clearly, in this Fisher market, it is optimal to allocate items 1 to N to the only agent who wants
it (x∗i,i = 1), and thus the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare for this market becomes
max
∑
i
log
(
u˜i,t(0) +
xi,Mvi,t
2
)
s.t.
∑
i
xi,T ≤ 1
xi,j ≥ 0
Changing variables zi =
xi,M
2 leads to the optimization problem identical to the one in Set-Aside
Greedy. This implies the equivalence between the online solution zˆt and the optimal solution x∗ for
the constructed Fisher market: zˆi,t = x∗i,M/2.
On the other hand, KKT conditions for this static Fisher market give ([Nisan et al., 2007,
Chapter 5]):
x∗i,M 6= 0⇒
vi,t
u˜i,t(0) +
vi,tx∗i,M
2
= max
i′
vi′,t
u˜i′,t(0) +
vi′,tx∗i′,M
2
Now, substituting zˆi,t =
x∗i,M
2 yields the statement of the lemma.
4.2 Bounding the Competitive Ratio of Set-Aside Greedy
Consider the allocations zˆ made under Set-Aside Greedy, and the corresponding promised prices
p˜t(zˆt) = maxi
vi,t
u˜i,t(zˆt)
. These prices satisfy the condition of Lemma 1, since we have from the defini-
tion of the promised utilities that p˜t(zˆt) = maxi
vi,t
u˜i,t(zˆt)
≥ vi,tui(xˆ) . To complete the proof of Theorem 2,
we need to argue that
∑T
t p˜t(zˆt) is small. Recall we define k = k(v) = T maxi,t{vi,t}. To upper
bound the promised prices we first need to define the following potential-like function.
Definition 2. For t ∈ [T ] and feasible semi-allocation zt with zi,t ≥ 0,
∑
i zi,t = 1/2, define
Ut(zt) =
∑
i
ln
(
min
{
k
N
, u˜i,t(zt)
})
The following lemma provides an upper bound for the promised price in round t in terms of the
change in the function Ut(zˆt).
Lemma 3. Under Set-Aside Greedy, in every round t we have
p˜t(zˆt) ≤ 2(Ut(zˆt)− Ut(0)) + N
T
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Proof. Note that since u˜i,t(zt) is weakly increasing in zt, for every t ∈ [T ] we have Ut(zˆt)−Ut(0) ≥ 0.
As a result, the lemma holds for every round t when p˜t(zˆt) ≤ NT . The rest of the proof shows that
the lemma is also true for rounds t when p˜t(zˆt) = maxi
vi,t
u˜i,t(zˆt)
> NT . This, together with Lemma 2,
implies that for every agent i for whom zˆi,t > 0 we have u˜i,t(zˆt) <
T ·vi,t
N ≤ kN , and thus, according
to Definition 2 of Ut(zt), we get
Ut(zˆt)− Ut(0) =
∑
i:zˆi,t>0
[
ln
(
min
{
k
N
, u˜i,t(zˆt)
})
− ln
(
min
{
k
N
, u˜i,t(0)
})]
=
∑
i:zˆi,t>0
[ln u˜i,t(zˆi,t)− ln u˜i,t(0)] =
∑
i:zˆi,t>0
∫ zˆi,t
zi,t=0
d ln u˜i,t(zi,t)
dzi,t
dzi,t
=
∑
i:zˆi,t>0
∫ zˆi,t
zi,t=0
vi,t
u˜i,t(zi,t)
dzi,t,
where the first equality uses the fact that only agents with-non zero semi-allocation zˆi,t contribute
to Ut(zˆ) − Ut(0) by definition of Ut, and the second equality follows from the established above
bound u˜i,t(zˆt) ≤ kN . Now, since u˜i,t(zi,t) ≤ u˜i,t(zˆi,t) for all zi,t ≤ zˆi,t, we have:
Ut(zˆt)− Ut(0) ≥
∑
i:zˆi,t>0
zˆi,t
vi,t
u˜i,t(zˆi,t)
=
∑
i:zˆi,t>0
zˆi,tp˜t(zˆt) =
p˜t(zˆt)
2
,
where we use Lemma 2 again and
∑
i zˆi,t = 1/2. Finally, since N/T ≥ 0, we get the result.
Theorem 2 is now a simple corollary of this bound.
Lemma 4. For allocation zˆt made by Set-Aside Greedy, the following holds for any instance∑T
t=1 p˜t(zˆt)
N
≤ 2 ln(k) + 2 ln(2) + 1,
Proof of Lemma 4. Using Lemma 3, we get
T∑
t=1
p˜t(zˆt) ≤
T∑
t=1
(
2(Ut(zˆt)− Ut(0)) + N
T
)
= 2(UT (zˆT )− U1(0)) +N. (1)
Here, we used the fact that Ut−1(zˆt−1) = Ut(0), as the promised utility at the end of some
round t − 1 equals to the promised utility at the beginning of round t (that is, before anything is
allocated). Note that, since for every round t and allocation zt we have u˜i,t(zˆt) ≤ 1, this implies that
Ut(zˆt) ≤ 0. Also, note that since k ≥ 1 and u˜i,t(zˆt) ≥ 1/(2N) for every agent i and round t, we get
that Ut(zt) ≥ N ln(1/(2N)) for any zt. Therefore, in any round t we have Ut(zˆt) ∈ [N ln(1/(2N)), 0]
which, combined with (1) above yields the desired bound with respect to N :∑T
t=1 p˜t(zˆt)
N
≤ 2
N
(UT (zˆT )− U1(0)) + 1
≤ 2
N
(0−N ln(1/(2N))) + 1
= 2 ln(N) + 2 ln(2) + 1,
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In fact, for instances with k(v) < N we get a better upper bound of Ut(zˆt) ≤ N ln(k/N), which
leads to a stronger bound, parameterized by k:∑T
t=1 p˜t(zˆt)
N
≤ 2
N
(N ln(k/N)−N ln(1/(2N))) + 1
= 2 ln(k) + 2 ln(2) + 1,
Corollary 1. The competitive ratio of Set-Aside Greedy is at most 2 ln(min{k(v), N})+2 ln(2)+1.
The corollary is a straightforward application of Lemma 1, as the promised prices p˜t(zˆt) satisfy
the inequalities in the statement of the lemma.
5 A Matching Lower Bound for the Nash Social Welfare
Finally, we complement our positive result by showing that it is tight up to sub-logarithmic factors.
Theorem 3. For online Nash social welfare maximization, for any  > 0, no algorithm can achieve
a competitive ratio of O(log1−N) or O(log1− T ).
The hard instance here is similar in spirit to the one we use in the proof of Theorem 1. First, at
some time t we ask the algorithm to allocate between agents with identical values. In later rounds,
some agents are able to obtain large values without competition (i.e., there are rounds when only
one agent has a non-zero value). Other agents, however, clash for a single item on some future
round t′ > t, and are thus unable to get much value from future rounds. This scheme exploits the
fact that an online algorithm is unable to predict which agents are going to clash.
5.1 Lower Bound Construction
We now give a formal description of the instance. Let N be large enough such that M = log(1−)N
is an integer (throughout the proof we assume that for large enough N and rational  all choices of
integer parameters are in fact integer). Also, let L be an integer constant to be chosen later on. For
each pair of integers m, ` such that 1 ≤ m ≤ M and 1 ≤ ` ≤ L, we let wm,` = 1
log(L−`+1)(M−m+1)N
.
Note that for any constant L, we have wm,` = Ω(1/N) and wm,` = o(1/M). Also, for any fixed `
we have w
m,`
wm+1,`
= 1logN = o(1/M).
To make our description more readable, it is useful to split up rounds in our instance into a
hierarchy of repeating cycles. In more detail, our instance is made up of three eras: We will call
them the Era of Banishment, the Era of Plenty, and the Era of Collapse. The Era of Banishment
is further subdivided into years, with a year comprising of months. The structure of the instance is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Era of Banishment. This era lasts N(1 − 1/2L) rounds. It consists of L years (indexed by
` ∈ [L]), with year ` lasting N/2` rounds. Each year consists of months (indexed by m ∈ [M ]),
where each month lastingM rounds. (Note that different years contain different number of months.
Namely, year ` contains N
2`M
months.) In each year of the Era of Banishment, agents are split into
“banished” and “cleared”, by banishingM agents and clearing M agents per month. Once banished,
an agent never has non-zero valuation again until very last round (the Era of Collapse). The cleared
agents lose their status at the end of the year (and can become cleared or banished in the next year).
In the first round of month m of year `, there areM agents who are neither banished nor cleared
who have value w1,l (everyone else has value 0). After the algorithm A makes an allocation xt, we
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t Era of Banishment
1 w11 w11 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 w21 w21 0 0 0 0 0
Month 1
3 0 0 0 0 w11 w11 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 w21 w21 0
Month 2
Year 1
5 0 0 w12 w12 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 w22 0 0 w22 0
Month 1 Year 2
Era of Plenty
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1− w21 − w22 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Era of Collapse
9 1− w11 1− w11 − w21 1− w21 − w12 1− w12 − w22 1− w11 1− w11 − w21 0 0
1
Figure 2: Competitive-ratio lower bound for NSW : illustrating the hard instance from Theorem 3. Values in cells
are the values of the agents on different rounds, orange represents the agent being banished, and green being clear.
find an agent for whom xi,t ≤ 1/M (such agent always exists by pigeonhole principle) and this agent
becomes banished.
On round z ∈ [2,M ] of this month there are M − 1 agents from previous round plus one new
agent (who isn’t banished and hasn’t been cleared this year) with values wz` (remaining agents,
including the banished ones, have value 0). After the allocation is made, we repeat the banishing
procedure described above. By the end of the month, we have banished M agents, and we declare
all agents who had non-zero value this month but weren’t banished (there are M − 1 such agents)
to be cleared. To make the accounting easier, we additionally clear 1 more agent who hasn’t been
cleared or banished before in this year (thus equalizing number of banished and cleared agents in
this month). Also note that all agents can have non-zero value during only one month in a year,
since during this month they have to become either banished or cleared.
The number of months in the year is N
2`M
, as after this many months every agent is either
banished or cleared. At the end of the year, the cleared agents lose their status (but banished
agents remain such), and the next year begins.
Thus, every year of this era we banish half the agents that were not banished, and by the end
of the era (which lasts L years) we banish N(1− 1/2L) agents.
We also note that very little value is seen by the agents during this Era (compared to their total
allowed value of
∑
t vi,t = 1). Since during the Era of Banishment each agent participates in at most
one month a year, the total value seen by an agent during the era of Banishment can be bound by∑
m,`w
m,` ≤MLwM,L = L log1−NlogN = o(1) (since the number of years L is a constant).
Era of Plenty. This era begins at t = N(1− 1/2L) + 1 and lasts N/2L rounds. At every round
there is a single non-banished agent with the remainder of their value vi,t = 1−
∑N(1−1/2L)
t′=1 vi,t′ =
1 − o(1) (see the paragraph above for the justification of the last equality). All other agents have
zero value on this round).
Era of Collapse. This era consists of just one round, t = T = N + 1. At this round, all
banished agents have the remainder of their value vi,t = 1−
∑N
t′=1 vi,t′ = 1− o(1).
5.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Assume that there exists an online algorithm A that achieves an competitive ratio of log1− T or
log1−N for some constant  ≥ 0. We prove that this leads to a contradiction by showing that A
would fail to satisfy these guarantees for the instance described above.
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We first provide a lower bound for the optimal Nash social welfare in this instance. During the
Era of Banishment we can give the item to the agent who is about to become banished, during the
Era of Plenty we give the item to the only agent with non-zero value, during the Era of Collapse
we split the item equally between the agents.
In this case, utility of banished agents u∗i can be lower bounded with the value w
ij on the round
when they got banished, and utility of non-banished agents is 1− o(1), because ∑m≤M,`≤Lwm,` =
o(1) according to our definition of wm,` above.
We now compute utilities under the allocation made by the online algorithm. Every
banished agent got 1/M fraction of the item on the round that they got banished, and their values
on previous rounds is negligible vi,t′ = o(vi,t/M), since w
m−1,`
wm,`
= o(1/M).
Finally, we argue that the last round does not affect the utilities of banished agents much.
Intuitively, this is because there is only one item and O(N) banished agents who have approximately
equal value for it. We provide a more careful argument below.
We upper bound optimal utilities on the last round by assuming banished agents got 1/M of
the item on which they got banished (by construction, maximum possible amount), and assuming
that the algorithm makes optimal NSW allocation on the last round.
The optimal NSW solution, when choosing between agents with equal values, allocates the marginal
fraction of the item to the agent with lowest utility. Note that, on the last round, there are N/2M
agents with value w11 (the smallest value of wlm). Thus, if the item is distributed between them,
each agent gets the utility of 2MN =
2 log1−
N = o(w
11/M), thus not improving their utility by even a
constant factor ( and so it will distribute the entire item between the agents with w11) .
Thus, overall, utility of banished agents can be upper-bounded by ui ≤ u
∗
i
M + o(
u∗i
M ). We bound
utility of non-banished agents with ui ≤ 1.
Now we can bound the competitive ratio achieved by the online algorithm:
NSW (x)
NSW (x∗)
≤
[
ui
u∗i
]1/N
≤
[(
1
M
)N(1−1/2L)( 1
1− o(1)
)N/2L]1/N
≈
(
1
M
)1−1/2L
= log1−
′
N
.
Now, we can pick the constant L (and appropriately large N) to make sure ′ ≤ δ.
6 Discussion
We conclude with a brief discussion regarding the our model and possible extensions of our results.
Allocating multiple items per round. It is worth noting that all our results readily generalize
to a setting where multiple items can arrive on a single round. The reduction is to split a single
round with multiple items into multiple “imaginary” rounds with a single item in each. Under this
reduction, our approximation guarantees stay intact, with number of rounds T replaced by the total
number of items.
Allocating indivisible items using randomness. Also, note that even if the items are actually
indivisible, i.e., each item can be allocated to at most one agent, then both our upper bounds and
our lower bounds extend to this setting as well by considering randomized algorithms. In this case,
we can evaluate the agents’ expected utility based on the probability that they receive each item,
and linearity of expectations reduces this setting to the one studied in this paper.
Normalization of valuations. Throughout the paper we assume agent valuations are normalized
so that
∑T
t=1 vi,t = 1. This normalization is the standard assumption in all of the cake-cutting
literature, as well as in other work on the offline fair division of goods, where the values are used
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to indicate relative preferences of the agents among the goods rather than absolute values. For
example, if we have three items and an agent values the second one three times as much as the first
and the third one six times as much as the first, the valuation vectors [1, 3, 6] and [0.1, 0.3, 0.6] both
convey the same information. Similarly, in our setting each agent i’s vi,t value in round t effectively
compares her value for the current item relative to her (anticipated) average value in the long run.
Thus, in the online setting, this normalization can be interpreted as the assumption that agents have
some information about the future that allows them to compare their current value to the long-term
average. In fact, it is easy to see that without any information regarding the possible future values
of the agents it is impossible to achieve any non-trivial competitive ratio (see Appendix A.1 for
a formal argument). In many real world applications agents implicitly express these normalized
preferences through some form of tokens, or a budget of artificial currency, that they need to spend
within a predetermined time horizon. This artificial budget essentially asks that the agents evaluate
how much they need to use a resource today (e.g., using a cluster to process some task) compared
to their anticipated future demand for this resource, which leads to exactly the same normalization.
It is worth noting that the actual constant that the values add up to in the normalization has no
impact on our competitive ratio bounds. For example, if were to instead scale the valuations so
that
∑T
t=1 vi,t = C for every agent i, the value of C would not alter the competitive ratio bounds.
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A Appendix
A.1 Non-normalized valuations
Here we show that without the assumption
∑
t vi,t = 1 there is no hope for a non-trivial competitive
ratio for NSW in online setting. It is easy to see that splitting every item equally gives a 1/N
approximation of NSW. We now prove the following result.
Theorem 4. Assume the setting of the paper, excluding the assumption
∑
t vi,t = 1. Then, for any
δ > 0 there is no online algorithm that guarantees a eN + δ approximation of NSW.
Proof. We assume an arbitrary online allocation algorithmM is employed and construct an instance
on which it fails to provide a eN + δ approximation to NSW.
There are T = N rounds in the instance. At t = 1 all agents have the value of vi,t = 1. We
then pick an agent for whom xi,t ≤ 1/N (who exists by pigeonhole principle) and that ensure this
agent would never have non-zero values for the rest of the instance (we would refer to such agents
as frozen).
At any round t we will have non-frozen agent to have values vi,t = 1t ( we will pick a sufficiently
small  < 1 later on), and freeze the agent whose allocation is xi,t ≤ 1/(N − t).
NSW of the optimal allocation x∗ can be lower bounded by, on round t, allocating all of to the
agent who is about to get frozen, this yields ui(x∗) ≥ 1/i−1 (we rename indices in the order of
being frozen).
On the other hand, by construction the algorithm M achieves ui ≤ ui(x
∗)
i + O(
ui(x
∗)
i ). This
yields a lower bound for the NSW approximation ratio NSWNSW ∗ ≤ ( 1N ! +O())1/N ≈ eN +O(1/N ).
Clearly, choosing a sufficiently small  would yield the needed lower bound for any δ > 0.
A.2 Proportional allocation (Proof of Proposition 1)
In Section 3.1 we mentioned that proportional allocation Pareto-dominates uniform allocation in
terms of agents’ utilities. With the following theorem we prove this fact.
Theorem 5. For any instance, let x˜ be the allocations made by proportional allocation x˜i,t =
vi,t∑
j vj,t
.
Then
ui(x˜) ≥ 1
N
Proof. We fix any agent i, the parameters T and N , and the values of this agent vi,t. We prove the
statement of the theorem by optimizing the values of all other agents to make the utility of agent i
as small as possible, and show that the minimum value is never less than 1/N .
Notice that for the Proportional Sharing allocations xi,t of agent i it does not matter what
particular values everyone else reports, only their sum is important, as xi,t =
vi,t
vi,t+
∑
j 6=i vj,t
. So,
in minimizing the utility of agent i, one can think of agents other than i as a single super-agent
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who can report values v′t that sum up to no more than N − 1. Then, the problem becomes one of
choosing v′t as to minimize the utility of agent i, which is the following convex program:
min
v′
∑
t
vi,t
vi,t
vi,t + v′t
s.t.
∑
t
v′t ≤ N − 1.
Lagrangifying the constraint with λ variable, one can write down the first-order conditions for
this program:
− v
2
i,t
(vi,t + v′t)2
+ λ = 0 for all t (2)∑
t
v′t = N − 1 (3)
To solve it, we substitute v′t = αvi,t, which solves the first equation for all t if λ =
1
(1+α)2
, and then
find α from the second equation: ∑
t
v′t = α
∑
t
vi,t = n− 1
Since
∑
t vi,t = 1, we get α = N − 1 and v′t = (N − 1)vi,t.
This means that on every round the utility-minimizing allocation xi,t =
vi,t
vi,t+v′t
= 1N is the
uniform allocation, and the statement of the theorem follows.
A.3 Myopic Greedy Algorithm (Proof of Proposition 2)
In this section, we show that a simple greedy algorithm that chooses allocation {xi,t}i∈[N ] so as to
maximize the NSW at the end of round t, has Ω(N) competitive ratio.
Let ui,t(xt) =
∑
t′=1 xi,t′vi,t′ be the utility of agent i for all rounds up to t. The myopic greedy
algorithm is formally defined as:
xˆt = arg max
xt
∑
i
log(ui,t(xt))
s.t.
∑
i
xi,t ≤ 1 , xi,t ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ [N ]
Analogous to Lemma 2, the myopic greedy algorithm can be interpreted as a myopic price-minimizer.
Lemma 5. Consider allocation xˆt made by the myopic greedy algorithm in some round t. Then
xˆi,t 6= 0⇒ vi,t
ui,t(xˆt)
= max
i′
vi′t
u˜i′txˆi,t
= pˆt
Now consider the following instance with T = N2: In rounds t ∈ [1, N ] agent i = 1 has value
v1t = 1/N ; agents other than 1 have values vi,t = 1/NN
2−t+1, which although geometrically growing
in t, is still vanishingly small compared to the active agent. We refer to these as the ‘active’ rounds
for agent 1.
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After N rounds, agent 1 exhausts her total value. Now for rounds t ∈ [N + 1, 2N ], agent 2
is active, with value v2t = 1N −
∑
t′<t v2t′
N =
1
N − o( 1N ), while agents i > 2 continue to have value
vi,t = 1/N
(N2−t+1). This process repeats, with agent i active in rounds t ∈ [(i− 1)N + 1, iN ]; thus
at the end of N2 rounds, each agent is for N rounds.
To bound the competitive ratio of myopic greedy on this instance, first note that the optimal
allocation can be lower bounded by always giving the item to the active agent, which yields ui(x) ≥
1− o(1/N), and thus the optimal NSW ≥ 1− o(1/N).
On the other hand, Lemma 5 implies that in round t, the myopic greedy algorithm allocates the
item to the agent who maximizes the ratio vi,tui,t(xt) . In round (i − 1)N + 1 when agent i is active
for the first time, we can upper bound their utility by assuming they obtain the whole item (and
thus the value of k/T − o(1/T )). On the following rounds the ratio vi,tui,t(xt) = 1− o(1) for the active
agents, but vi,tui,t(xt) ≥ N − i for the other agents with non-zero value (the bound of N − i comes from
allocating all of the items equally between non-active agents with non-zero value). Thus the active
agent is not allocated anything on any rounds except for the first one.
Thus for the utilities of agents in the greedy solution can be bounded with ui(xˆ) ≤ 1N + o( 1N ).
This implies an approximation factor A ≥ N , which is no better than just allocating all items
equally between the agents.
A.4 Computational Tractability of the Set-Aside Greedy Algorithm
We now briefly note that the Set-Aside Greedy algorithm is quite tractable from a computational
standpoint. The most demanding operation of this algorithm involves the computation of zˆi,t for
each round t according to the following program:
zˆt = arg max
zt
∑
log(u˜i,t(zt))
s.t.
∑
i
zi,t ≤ 1
2
zi,t ≥ 0.
Although this is a convex program that can be solved in polynomial time, we can actually also
provide a fast alternative process for computing this allocation. Lemma 2 implies that the problem
above is equivalent to the problem of minimizing the current promised price:
zˆt = arg min
zt
pt (4)
s.t.
∑
i
zi,t ≤ 1
2
zi,t ≥ 0
pt ≥ vi
u˜i(zt)
(5)
We now provide an algorithm to solve this problem. The idea is to allocate the marginal fraction
of the item to the agents for whom the constraint (5) is binding, as there is no other way to decrease
the objective. We now demonstrate how to allocate the entire item this way N steps.
We initialize zi,t = 0 for every agent, and initialize the unallocated fraction of the item at
B = 1/2. We order the agents in decreasing order on their vi,tu˜i,t(zi,t) ratios using their promised
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utilities. Assuming that the agents are re-indexed according to this order, agent 1 has the highest
ratio and agent N has the lowest ratio. For each agent i < N , we then compute the value δi which
is the solution to the following equation:
vi,t
u˜i,t(δi)
=
vi+1,t
u˜i+1,t(0)
.
This value, δi captures how much allocation does agent i need to catch up to the next agent in
terms of the vi,tu˜i,t(δi) ratio.
Starting with i = 1, we then execute the following steps. If iδi ≤ B, we allocate δi to agent i
and all agents before i: zj,t := zj,t + δi for j ≤ i, update the remaining allocation B := B− iδi and
move on to the next step i := i+ 1.
If iδi > B, we allocate the remaining item fraction B equally between the agent i and agents
before i, zj,t := zj,t + Bi for j ≤ i (terminating the algorithm on this round).
If the algorithm gets to i = N , we similarly allocate the remaining item fraction equally between
everyone zj,t := zj,t + BN for all j ∈ N .
Thus the number of operations on a single round is at most O(N), giving us O(TN) complexity
for making the allocations over all rounds.
We now briefly give an argument for correctness. First, as we mentioned before, it is always
optimal to allocate the marginal fraction of the item to the agent with the smallest vi,tu˜i,t(zi,t) ratio,
where zi,t is the allocation given to agent i so far. The second thing we need to note is that, when
this ratio is tied between several agents
vi,t
u˜i,t(zi,t)
=
vj,t
u˜j,t(zj,t)
, (6)
adding equal values  to their allocation preserves the tie
vi,t
u˜i,t(zi,t + )
=
vj,t
u˜j,t(zj,t + )
To see that this is true, recall that u˜i,t(zi,t + ) = ui,t(zi,t) + vi,t, and cancel out equal terms
implied by (6).
This implies that the algorithm always allocates the marginal fraction of the item to the agents
minimizing the vi,tu˜i,t(zi,t) ratio, and thus solves (4) exactly.
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